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What does it actually mean to belong to a public? Strangely enough, this question 
is hardly addressed in publications about the issue of the public. Public is never 
approached from an individual perspective, but is always seen as a group, as an 
undifferentiated mass that must be segmented, reached and serviced in order to 
let the cultural market function. However, those discussing the issue rarely seem 
to be a part of that real potential public themselves. In this article, by contrast, I 
will attempt to study the public from that personal perspective. Obviously, this 
attempt is doomed to fail, since I, as a professional beholder, am ‘hors publique’: 
I am supposed to observe everything with interest, to always be there without 
being actually involved. That I will nonetheless attempt to explore the public 
from a personal point of view is because I wish to find out how the individual 
and the general are intertwined when one is part of a public, and how this relates 
to the confusion between the private and the public that is characteristic of pu-
blic space nowadays. In the course of this exploration I will inevitably move on 
from my own experience to that of a supposed group bound ‘I’.
Today, the public is more present than ever before. It is not only one of the 
main elements that determine the policies of governments and art institutes, but 
is more massively present than ever before, both physically and virtually. Muse-
ums and other art institutes are expected to go to extremes in order to reach out 
to a ‘different’ public. Highly educated, grey-haired people no longer suffice: the 
intended target group is young, poly cultural and unskilled. And more than ever, 
museums use all possible means, from a multitude of social media to logistic ope-
rations, to bring in this potential public. Such efforts also affect programming. 
Thinking in terms of target groups implies that they differ in their preferences 
and that this should be taken into account if they are to be reached.
These target groups usually are rather vaguely defined in socio-cultural terms: 
they are defined by a combination of chance and choice. Unwished-for economic 
circumstances go hand-in-hand with self-selected spending patterns, which ma-
kes it difficult to decide how best to approach such groups. Following the Belgian 
philosopher Isabelle Stengers, I will call these different groups forming as many 
publics ‘practices’, because attracting these potential publics can only succeed if 
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one manages to relate to the manner in which they regard their being-a-public 
as part of their practice. After all, before I visited that specific exhibition in that 
particular museum, I was already part of a certain public, since I was willing to 
go to an exhibition, or to go and see that artwork. The practice that determines 
that I am or will be that public is primarily formed by upbringing and education 
and is embedded in other forms and activities, in a complex whole of choices and 
habits, places and presences, that play a part in my decision to go and look at art 
in that place, and at that moment. As Stengers stresses, it is a practice to which 
I belong, not one I am a part of. The distinction lies in the overarching, passive 
character of the latter phrase, against the active, conscious one of the former.1 
This is not about consuming, at least it cannot be reduced to that, but about an 
act, a choice, an activity. By belonging to a certain public practice I, as public, 
am an a priori ‘we’, because otherwise I would not have been there at that mo-
ment at all. A practice comes with rules and responsibilities, it allows me to do, 
understand and produce things. Or not to do them, or to neglect them, without 
leaving that practice behind. If we regard being-public as part of a certain prac-
tice, we also understand how we can be an art public without actually visiting a 
museum or theatre. We regard the mere possibility to make use of these cultural 
facilities as part of our practice and this co-determines our preference for where 
to live, as was shown in Gerard Marlet’s study.2
A major part of the current policy of museums can be understood as an at-
tempt to become part of public practices that do not naturally include museums 
in their domain. Seen from this perspective, it also becomes clear why museums 
spread their activities in such a manner that they sometimes resemble shops, 
coffee bars or restaurants more than places where art is paramount. We cannot 
simply dismiss the motives for this as commercial gain or a neglect of core tasks: 
these are elements that belong to certain practices, practices that can be stretched 
by making looking at art part of the experience of shopping, drinking a café latte 
and having a nice dinner. By transforming themselves into less unequivocal pla-
ces, by becoming nodes of practices, museums of contemporary art succeed in 
hosting other practices too: one can now visit a museum of modern art without 
immediately regarding oneself as its public.
Public Practices
What kind of public am I outside the museum? In what way is art in the public 
domain part of my practice? Or perhaps the question should be: in what way can 
art in the public domain be part of existing practices? Because whereas it is clear 
that in the museum a number of different practices come together, the public in 
public space is by definition indeterminate. There is no specific public for these 
artworks, which have to fend for themselves without the benefit of a clear fram-
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ework. It is this vagueness that makes it difficult for artists to clearly place their 
work and drives commissioning bodies to distraction because they don’t really 
know whether the work they have commissioned will be embraced, tolerated, 
ignored or rejected.
This was not always so. Just as the museum for modern art was once for eve-
ryone without being accountable for whether anyone actually came, art in public 
space used to lead a carefree existence in the belief that it benefited the common 
good. After this general visual language was exposed as the representation of 
the self-interest of the ruling class, a lot changed. The public no longer consists 
of an unstructured collection of individuals but, in the public domain as in the 
museum, of specific groups that all require a specific approach. But whereas in 
the museum it is a matter of bringing these groups together by creating an en-
vironment and providing a programme that meets their wishes, in public space 
it is art itself that must adapt to certain places and communities. Over the past 
few decades, the public domain has been subdivided into ever more intricate 
zones and areas with specific aims or characteristics. And the artworks take their 
place in this. While the inner cities are for festivals and spectacular landmark 
artworks that should convince visitors of the cultural value of the city, in the 
residential areas outside the centre the needs of the population must be met by 
more accessible art. And in underprivileged neighbourhoods—euphemistically 
renamed ‘power neighbourhoods’ in the Netherlands—the focus is on projects 
that foreground social participation and co-creation.
However, such emphatic localizing and territorializing appear to become less 
and less necessary. Social media now enable us to continue our shared practices 
anywhere, anytime. All we need is an available network. But this virtual practice, 
which is neither completely private nor fully public and so clearly demonstrates 
that the core of the We feeling, of the choices and responsibilities that come with 
belonging to a certain practice, cannot escape from the physical environment 
that I perforce share with others: other individuals, groups and practices. Where 
I live, work, do my shopping and go out is part of the practices to which I belong, 
while simultaneously shaping them.
Stengers advocates approaching different practices from their own preferen-
ces and not gauge them by general values that either belittle them or force them 
onto the defensive. She specifically opposes enlightenment operations aimed at 
eliciting hidden or suppressed creative forces.3 Many current social practices are 
facing this reproach, and I will come back to that later. An agenda aimed at edu-
cation and emancipation is however no longer the obvious thing. More and more 
often Dutch government policy stimulates and supports art projects that aim to 
consolidate or facilitate existing practices. The ‘ecology of practices’ mentioned 
by Stengers appears to be the guiding principle of this policy. Social cohesion, 
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neighbourhood meetings, empowerment of the disenfranchised, but also a po-
licy aimed at realizing artworks on the initiative of local residents, as practised 
by the CBK (Centre for Visual Art) in Rotterdam: it all points to reinforcing 
public practices as a method to enhance the quality of life in the city and make 
residents feel at home in a context that adapts itself to them instead of the other 
way around.
No matter how successful this approach may be, it does have its downsides. 
The ecology of practices is not all peaceful. Different public practices can severe-
ly hinder each other or even be mutually exclusive. Any policy wishing to steer 
things in the right direction will inevitably favour certain living habits and prefe-
rences and certain groups will be marginalized or excluded because of strategic 
or stealthy gentrification of certain areas. And such a policy, as Pascal Gielen 
observes, also results in an impoverished public domain. The confrontation with 
what is different, deviant and strange is increasingly avoided and we lose sight of 
the fundamental differences between certain practices. People living in cities are 
no longer questioned as to their preferences and prejudices. Because of this, not 
just the political dimension of the public domain is lost, as Gielen states, but one 
may also wonder where on this neatly ordered map of preferences and practices 
there is still a place for publicness, a place one could call public.4 Within the 
context of the present text the main objection is that this approach robs art of its 
ability to bring about the openness of the society, the essential space for what is 
other and different.5 To come back to the question at the beginning of this essay: 
in the public domain I am increasingly waited on hand and foot, but is that what 
I expect in my public practice?
Not-I
Let’s leave the street and return to the exhibition space. Whereas music is known 
for forming bonds, many forms of visual art appeal to individual experience, 
which makes the presence of others irksome rather than stimulating.6  According 
to the Danish sculptor/installation artist Olafur Eliasson, the only thing that vi-
sitors to an exhibition have in common is that they are completely different from 
each other. Everyone sees and thinks something different in the encounter with 
an artwork, yet the entire communication strategy of the museum that displays 
the work is aimed at combining this multitude of experiences into the greatest 
common denominator. Still according to Eliasson, this means that visitors are 
addressed in a moralizing or patronizing manner.7 And he is right. The minute 
I visit an exhibition, I am part of the public there and addressed accordingly. 
And this annoys me, as does the presence of others admiring the same work and 
saying the same thing I am saying or perhaps something altogether different. 
However, I doubt whether this only applies to visual art. Other art forms may 
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be geared to receiving their public in groups and have a public that is sharing so-
mething by definition, if only by the fact that they see the same thing at the same 
moment at the same location. Still, the discomfort invoked by sharing an un-
shareable experience is something I can also feel when attending a performance 
of experimental music. Much more than with classical music and also more than 
with exhibitions of art that has already been part of the art canon for a long time. 
Apparently my public practice has two sides: one that doesn’t mind sharing the 
experience and accepts the We-feeling this evokes, and one that makes me feel 
uncomfortable and doesn’t want to belong to a ‘we’. If, based on experience, I 
assume that I share this not wanting to share an experience with many others, a 
public practice emerges that speaks to ‘the individual’, as opposed to a practice 
that gains in experiential strength through massiveness (rock concerts, sunny 
days in the park, sports and games, parties). 
Eliasson describes the individual experience as follows: ‘The fact is, of course, 
that everyone sees something different. Everyone sees himself or herself, you 
could say.’ He calls supporting this experience a project of individualization. 
Although I agree with him that we all probably see something different, I doubt 
whether we only have ourselves in our sights. If artworks would only be our 
mirrors, they couldn’t have the disruptive, unsettling effect we ascribe to them. 
Bruno Latour is more precise in his description of what happens in our encoun-
ter with an artwork, as this larger quote shows:
”A work of art engages us, and if it is quite true that it has to be interpreted, at 
no point do we have the feeling that we are free to do ‘whatever we want’ with 
it. If the work needs a subjective interpretation, it is in a very special sense of the 
adjective: we are subject to it, or rather we win our subjectivity through it. … 
Emitted by the work, such downloads allow the recipient to be moved while 
gradually becoming a ‘friend of interpretable objects’. If listeners are gripped by 
a piece, it is not at all because they are projecting their own pathetic subjectivity 
on it; it is because the work demands that they, insignificant amateurs, brilliant 
interpreters, or passionate critics, become part of its journey of instauration – but 
without dictating what they must do to show themselves worthy of it.”8
Becoming a subject, individualization, then is much more than simply recogni-
zing ourselves. It is much more a process in which we become something that 
wasn’t there before. At the risk of causing a huge conceptual confusion here and 
while realizing that I should present a much more elaborate exposé about these 
concepts that try to encapsulate what we, thrown back on ourselves, are, want, 
can, know and feel, I still would like to contrast this subjectification with the We-
experience that we also have or, rather, execute as part of our public practice. I 
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don’t mean to say that in this We-experience, in the choices we share with many 
others and in the experiences we gain in this and about which we communicate, 
write think and dream, we would not be subjects. Following Louis Althusser’s 
central thesis with regard to the function of ideology, one could say that in these 
practices we, as part of these practices, are ‘hailed as subjects’. And these days, 
this happens in a way and based on information about our preferences and choi-
ces that is much more elaborate than Althusser could ever have imagined. He 
regarded it as the basic ruse used by the dominant ideology to hide its suppressive 
character and make its subjects bring about their submission voluntarily.9 The 
public practices I am referring to here are not purely suppressive, as they enable 
us to shape our lives and make us feel at home. They did not, however, emerge 
fully autonomous either and in that sense the subject that is constructed in them 
becomes an hotchpotch of social expectations, commercial incentives, personal 
impulses and exchange protocols that make us part of certain communities of 
wishes with overlapping life patterns, fears and desires. A personal public-private 
construct with all of the associated problems.10 It is precisely this constructed 
subject, this ‘I’ that places me with that artwork at that moment, which—in 
the confrontation with that artwork—is torn down and has to be rebuilt from 
scratch.
I regard this disastrous effect that artworks can have on the makeshift con-
struction we call ‘I’ as the essence of the autonomy of art. It is an effect that art-
works seem to lose once we are used to them: the canon puts us at ease. Still, they 
never quite lose all their power: every good artwork retains the ability to move 
me to the core time and again, to hit me there were no public practice has been 
established yet. However, it must be given the opportunity to do so.
Manifestation and Misunderstanding
Outside the safe framework of the exhibition space artworks don’t have much 
chance of exerting their disruptive powers. Lost in an undifferentiated public 
domain they disturb nothing and no one. It seems that art in the public space 
can only be saved by a policy of placing them within a certain framework, the-
reby connecting them to existing (public) practices in which their visibility is 
guaranteed. And yet this is not quite so. In a sense this emphatic embedding can 
become the very thing that disrupts the possible effect of art works in and for 
the public domain. To illustrate what this entices I will introduce the concept of 
manifestation. A manifestation is both the appearance of a phenomenon and a 
public display. Whereas the first meaning of the word stresses the moment of be-
coming public, the second one is more suggestive of the presence of participants, 
or a public. Within the framework of this text one could say that this second 
meaning is more in line with public practices, but the term is also quite useful to 
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characterize the various ways in which art is brought into public space and con-
nected to existing practices. The preference for festivals that can mobilize many 
people for a short period, as well as the support of small-scale participation pro-
jects in which either real or fictitious communities work together on the initiative 
of an artist, show that gathering a certain audience for a certain event forms an 
essential starting point. Of course we cannot heap together all forms of art in 
public space, but even the revealing of a new sculpture in a refurbished square 
can be regarded as a manifestation, since the square manifests itself as new. It is 
an event that stresses the revised role of that place within the urban fabric, the in-
fluence of government and perhaps private parties in realizing it, and, finally, the 
practices in which the location is being inscribed. Then and there, the artwork 
symbolizes at once change and a connection to the real or desired community of 
the neighbourhood. While in huge political manifestations people express a sha-
red protest or resistance, these organized gatherings create a shared experience 
and an experience of sharing.11 One could also say that the careful alignment of 
the artwork with the wishes or needs of the residents and/or visitors makes a 
certain image of those wishes or needs concrete while excluding everything that 
deviates from them. Specific, unwanted practices are not included in the picture.
The shared experience that aims to stimulate and enhance these existing (pu-
blic) practices is usually accompanied by an overdosis of communication. Only in 
this manner does the manifestation become coherent and generates the desired 
consensus. And although the embedding in existing practices is an absolute con-
dition for the functioning of art in the public domain—without some form of 
recognition no form of acknowledgement is possible—the communication usu-
ally is not respectful of the artwork: the moralizing and patronizing signalled by 
Eliasson in the museum also applies to the public domain. And just as in an ex-
hibition a dominant theme and smart information campaign can compel an art-
work to soundlessly echo prompted wordings, the emphasis on communication 
with art in the public domain can render the artwork all but invisible, reducing 
it to no more than a vague shadow obscured by brochures filled with messages.
The trend as outlined above fits in the de-politicization of public space, as 
already observed by Gielen. The public domain is not something that must be 
established or confirmed; it is a social environment cum practice, a network of 
conflicts, confrontations, coalitions and constructions that is being realized over 
and over again, as it should be. In other words, the public domain is never de-
signed and never to be taken for granted. Unlike with the current approach, art 
could be a much stronger disturbing element: the artwork as the pre-eminent 
deviant or other, in order to underline the constantly to be gained open charac-
ter of shared space. In contrast with the view that art should convey what we 
have in common in order to support the public domain is Rancière’s proposition 
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that it is precisely dissensus, the disruption of what our senses are used to, that 
provides the opportunity for change and innovation. Rancière, who is more ex-
tensively discussed elsewhere in this publication, considers dis-identification, the 
fact that the artwork does not meet our expectations, a condition for any form of 
emancipation.12
Identification and confirmation of my (public) practice thus seem to be in 
direct opposition to denying them as a condition for being able to speak of a do-
main with the possibility of openness. And whereas theorists who are more con-
cerned with the value and functioning of art generally forefront dis-identification 
and dis-sensus, the theory of art in the public domain, even while embracing the 
basic idea of dissensus, advocates a necessary re-identification. The theory argues 
that the individual disruption of the senses and the resulting individualization 
or individuation cannot lead to the solidarity and joint resistance that are a con-
dition for changing the political balance.13 A certain form of re-identification 
seems inevitable if one really intends to challenge the powers that be.
High time to illustrate this with an example. Currently, in Flanders there is 
a project that not only clearly demonstrates some of the dilemmas mentioned 
earlier but also provides an adequate response to them. In the municipality of 
Herzele lies the old village Ressegem, one of the numerous townlets in the Fle-
mish countryside. It boasts the remnants of a motte-and-bailey castle, an old 
presbytery and some farmhouses in beautiful surroundings that are feeling the 
pressure of urbanization. What is special about Ressegem is that there has been 
a piece of common land in the centre of the village since time memorial. Plans 
to do something with this land have invariably led to much disagreement and 
have met with resistance from local residents. An initial plan to build a new 
town hall and a block of apartments there was rejected, but an alternative plan 
to make it into a special nature area could not win the support of the community 
either. In 2015, a special regulation from the Flemish government made it pos-
sible to start an art project that might contribute to finding a solution.14 Now, 
such circumstances tend to lead to participatory projects in which the artwork 
consist primarily of the collaboration between the artist and the residents and the 
joint production generated by it. An understandable choice, as art projects that 
start from participation solve the problem of a practice in which art hardly plays 
a role and is not easily transformed in a public practice, by simply exchanging the 
element of ‘public’ by that of ‘participant’. This implies a number of risks. The 
implicit enlightenment strategy of this approach, aimed at bringing out hidden 
creative forces, was already signalled by Stengers. Also, quite often what comes 
to the fore as the community, is only a fraction of the actual residents, and the 
refusal to participate is either ignored or dismissed as impotence, when it would 
be better to regard this attitude as a defence of the own practice. Above all, ho-
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wever, by emphasizing the We-experience such projects seem to be avoiding the 
disruptive effect of art at all costs, but in doing so they also miss the chance to 
let new forms of subjectivity emerge.
In Ressegem two artists, Birthe Leemeijer and David Helbich, in collaboration 
with curator Nils van Beek, have developed a non-standard approach that meets 
many of the objections. They propose to divide the commons in as many lots as 
there are residents and let each resident manage their own tiny piece of land. By 
doing so the project focuses on the community as a whole, on all the residents, 
while at the same time testing this community’s cohesion and solidarity. More 
importantly, in my opinion, is that this approach brings back art to the point 
where its authority is most evident: the subject that must decide how to relate to 
the impossible choices that the artwork offers. And the outcome may well be ne-
gative. Contrary to models of public outreach that are common to art institutes 
as well as participatory projects, in which only presence and participation count, 
in this project the rejection will also become visible. Those who do not partici-
pate also own a piece of land that lies fallow, thereby proclaiming what choice 
was made. And exactly this, this manifestation of disinterest—which questions 
my own faith in art in the public domain and forces me to rethink my preferences 
and put them in perspective—is what turns this small piece of land in Ressegem 
into a true public space.
It is impossible to predict what the end result of this project will be. It is up 
to the residents to make something of it on the basis of the ‘score’ provided by 
the artists. They chose the word ‘score’ aptly, as it stresses the communal fram-
ework while at the same time showing the necessity of a personal interpretation. 
This score does not contain an explanation or the intent of the project. It only 
provides the volume, rhythm and melody. This leads to a double moment of 
interpretation, a dual appropriation that in my view is crucial to the functioning 
of art and one of the great advantages of art in the public domain over art in 
the context of a museum. On the first level the artwork is given a place within 
the conceptual framework of the community. It speaks to certain problems and 
wishes and fits in a certain (public) practice. Without that it has no chance of 
succeeding. This not only applies to participatory projects, but to all art in public 
space. However, this alignment does not mean that the artwork fits seamlessly 
into this conceptual framework. On the contrary, because the second level of 
interpretation—on which the artwork addresses my understanding and the prac-
tices associated with that understanding—can only come about when there is 
something that is beyond my capacity to understand, a surplus that cannot be 
appropriated seamlessly. Stengers posits that practices maintain themselves by 
manipulating everything that they take over from other practices and not using 
it as it was intended. This mis-understanding is the most important manner by 
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which art reaches groups, becomes part of practices where art usually has no 
place. Only in this manner does art find a new public, a public that is confirmed 
in its preferences and choices and at the same time is given the chance to become 
a different public in the future.
So here I am, face-to-face with an artwork in the public domain. Is it an art-
work, or rather a concurrence of designed circumstances? Is there an intention, 
a meaning? There is no idea to support me. I have to find my own tentative way 
through this space that thereby becomes public.
Reproduced with the kind permission of the author and the publisher. Boomgaard, Jeroen. ’Public 
as Practice’, originally published in Being Public: How Art Creates the Public, edited by Jeroen 
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